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Introduction
To a considerable degree, religion as a source of conflict in 
Indonesia has been desensitized by the government’s careful adherence 
to a policy of religious freedom. Enshrined as the first principle of 
the Pancasila, the "five principles" adopted at the time of Indepen­
dence, is "belief in God." Admittedly it is mandatory to have such a 
belief, but the particular form this belief should take is not speci­
fied. Although in the 1971 census 87.5 percent of Indonesians declare 
themselves to be Moslems,* 1 members of other religious faiths are treated 
officially with complete equality. There are six religions officially 
recognized by the Department of Religious Affairs: Islam, Catholicism,
Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.2 The Department 
of Religious Affairs contributes financially not only to the activities 
of Moslems but to those of the other recognized religions as well, in­
cluding for example construction of church buildings and the educational 
and charitable work of the churches. This is in striking contrast to 
the situation in neighboring Malaysia, where Islam, although claiming 
adherence of only 50 percent of the total population, is enshrined as 
the state religion; resentments of non-Moslems have been reinforced by 
actions such as the use of general tax revenue to finance construction 
of the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur.
Success in desensitizing the religious issue in Indonesia has not 
been easily attained, nor will it be maintained in the future without 
great care. At the time of Independence, pressure from Moslem politi­
cal groups to declare Indonesia an Islamic state was very strong. How­
ever, the secular, western-educated nationalists represented by Sukarno 
and Hatta won the day and established the principle of religious free­
dom.3 Since Independence, too, there have been periods of stress: the
*The author wishes to acknowledge valuable comments from Soebardi, Anthony 
Reid, Charles Coppel, Peter Weldon, Robin Pryor, and Jim Fox and an anonymous referee 
on an earlier draft of this paper. They are in no way responsible for remaining de­
ficiencies in the paper.
1This estimate excludes the rural population of Irian Jaya, for whom detailed 
information was not collected in the census. Most of this population is not Moslem, 
but the numbers involved are only about half a million.
2J. A. Niels Mulder, ’’Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of the Javanese World­
view," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, I, 2 (September 1970), pp. 105-14. Hin­
duism was officially recognized only in 1962, over Moslem protests.
3See Harry J. Benda. The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under 
the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 186-204.
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Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s which, although a political move­
ment, advocated the creation of an Islamic state; periods of local 
Christian-Moslem conflict in the 1950s during which churches were 
burned in Aceh and Christian villages attacked by Darul Islam rebels 
in the Toraja area of South Sulawesi; persecution of the Chinese in 
some areas (e.g., in West Java in 1959-60 and in many regions of Indo­
nesia in 1965-67) which no doubt had its religious elements;4 and ten­
sions in the late 1960s stemming from Moslem reaction to the rapid 
increase in church membership in areas such as East and Central Java 
and the Karo Batak areas of North Sumatra.5
In March 1975, there was a flurry of concern in Jakarta and West 
Java when pamphlets, allegedly issued by spokesmen of a church group, 
mysteriously appeared; these pamphlets advised their readers of the 
advantages, political and otherwise, of adherence to Christianity.
The large number of Christians in positions of political and adminis­
trative power was apparently cited, along with the generally higher 
level of education of Christians in Indonesia. The real source of the 
pamphlets never became clear, at least to the general public, although 
official spokesmen stated that they were the work of remnants of the 
outlawed Indonesian Communist Party.6 Whatever the source, the nervous 
reaction of the government to the appearance of these pamphlets reflect­
ed its appreciation of the potential divisiveness of the religious 
issue.
The preservation of religious harmony in Indonesia is further 
complicated by the identification of suku bangsa (ethnic-linguistic 
groups) with religion and by the religious dimension of the tension 
between Java and the Outer Islands. Although the majority of the Outer 
Islands population is Moslem, most of the non-Moslems in Indonesia also 
live there. Thus most persons professing a minority (i.e., non-Moslem) 
religion also belong to a minority (i.e., non-Javanese) suku. Ethnic 
groups strongly identified with non-Moslem religions include the Toba 
and Simalungun Batak, the people of Nias, and the Minahasans and Toraja 
of Sulawesi (all overwhelmingly Protestant); the Ambonese and Timorese 
(about half of whom are Protestant); the Balinese (predominantly Hindu); 
and the population of Flores (predominantly Catholic). Chinese, scat­
tered throughout the urban areas of Indonesia, are predominantly "Bud­
dha Konghucu" (Buddhist or Confucianist), but a substantial minority 
are Christian.
Religion, and the social and economic differences between differ­
ent religious groups, is an important factor in Indonesian politics.
Much has been written about its role in party politics, interethnic 
rivalries, and regional differences in education and the status of women. 
However, very little quantitative analysis has been done on trends in
^Certainly, objections to the Chinese religion played a role in the anti-Chinese 
actions in the east coastal areas of East Java and the expulsion of the Chinese from 
Aceh, both in 1966, and in East Java in 1967. See Charles Coppel, "The Indonesian 
Chinese in the Sixties: A Study of an Ethnic Minority in a Period of Turbulent Polit­
ical Change" (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1975), chapters 3 and 4.
5See D. Bakker, "The Struggle for the Future: Some Significant Aspects of Con­
temporary Islam in Indonesia," Muslim World, LXII, 2 (1972), pp. 131-33.
eKompas, March 5, 1975.
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the religious composition of the Indonesian population or the relation­
ship between religion and education. With the publication of the 1971 
census data, a start can be made on such an analysis, although the data 
are still very limited. It will be the purpose of the present article, 
then, to trace historical trends in the religious composition of the 
Indonesian population, and to throw some light on the changing rela­
tionship between religion and education. The writer recognizes the 
danger of stressing the effect of religion on education simply because 
the data on religion are available whereas data on variables correlated 
with religion, such as wealth, status, and degree of westernization, 
which may be more important in accounting for educational differentials 
than religion itself, are not. However, by taking an historical ap­
proach it is hoped to avoid this danger since the complex of factors 
influencing religious and educational change in different regions will 
tend to become apparent.
The History of Religious Change in Indonesia
Early in the Christian era, there was a movement of Indian cul­
tural elements into the western half of present-day Indonesia. By the 
eighth century, Hinduism and Buddhism were deeply rooted in Sumatra and 
Java and formed the spiritual basis for a number of extensive empires, 
including Sriwijaya, centered in Palembang (seventh to eleventh cen­
turies), and Mataram, Singasari, and Madjapahit in Java (ninth to the 
fifteenth centuries).
The eastward expansion of Islam reached Indonesia in the twelfth 
century. Islam was brought by traders to the coastal areas, but its 
expansion was slow until the first Westerners appeared at the end of 
the fifteenth century. Then Islam was used as a rallying cry for re­
sistance to the successive encroachments of the Portuguese, Spanish, 
Dutch, and English. By the time the Dutch arrived in strength at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, Islam was firmly implanted in 
most of Sumatra, Java, and eastward as far as Sumbawa, as well as in 
the coastal areas of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and northern Maluku. But 
Catholicism had already made progress in Flores, Timor, and elsewhere 
under the Portuguese, while the mountain tribes in North Sumatra, Cen­
tral Sulawesi, and the interior of Kalimantan had either resisted Islam 
or been little exposed to it.
Islam, coming to Indonesia as it did "filtered through the reli­
gious experience of India,"7 * had acquired mystical elements that fitted 
it well for acceptance in the Indonesian setting. Especially on Java, 
it long remained no more than a thin veneer on Javanese religion. But 
from the latter part of the nineteenth century onward, Indonesian Islam 
gradually began to shed some of its syncretic characteristics, partly 
because of greatly increased contact with Mecca as rapidly increasing 
numbers of Indonesians undertook the hag .8 There remained on Java,
7Benda, The Crescent, p. 12.
eFrom about 1890 onwards, the number of Indonesians going to Mecca was about 
10,000 a year, and in the years 1910 to 1931 this had grown to more than 20,000 each 
year, representing roughly one-quarter of all those undertaking the hag. See Bernhard 
Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), 
pp. 10-11 and 41; and J. Vredenbregt, "The Haddj: Some of Its Features and Functions 
in Indonesia," Bigdragen tot de taal-, land- en votkenkunde, 118 (1962), pp. 91-154.
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however, a sharp difference between the santri and abangan variants of 
Islam.9 In greatly simplified terms, the santri can be identified with 
a concern with Islamic doctrine, with observing the prayers, with in­
tolerance for heterodox Javanese beliefs and practices and with a sense 
of the Islamic community, of ummat. By contrast, the abangan practice 
some form of the Javanese syncretic religion, though ”the dominance of 
animistic as well as Hindu-Buddhist folk beliefs shifts to an emphasis 
on more sophisticated beliefs integrating Hindu-Buddhist concepts of 
fate, reincarnation, pantheism and magico-mysticism, while moving from 
the lower to the higher social levels.” 10 Many abangan jokingly refer 
to themselves as ,fstatistical Moslems.”
The differences between the Statistical Moslems” and the more 
orthodox santri carry over into political, ideological and class con­
flicts. If Geertz’ analysis is correct, in recent years the reluctance 
among many abangan even formally to be regarded as Moslems has in­
creased, and there have been some pressures for including the kebatinan 
groups practicing various types of Javanese mysticism within the fold 
of recognized religious groups.11 Though this has not yet happened, 
it is becoming increasingly recognized that ”the Moslem community, 
properly understood, is a minority community in Java--a large minority 
but nevertheless a minority.” 12
Needless to say, the categorization of these diverse groups into 
one undifferentiated Moslem mass in the census seriously limits the 
analytic usefulness of the census data on religion. Outside Java, 
similar problems exist. Islam is generally known to be stronger and 
more orthodox in Aceh, among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, in the 
Banten region of West Java, and among the Buginese and Makassarese of 
South Sulawesi.
The history of Christianity begins with the proselytizing efforts 
of the Portuguese in Maluku during the 1530s. Francis Xavier spent 
much of the year 1546 in this region. By the late sixteenth century 
the number of Catholics in Indonesia numbered around 50,000, most of 
them in present-day Maluku, East Nusatenggara, and North Sulawesi. As 
Portuguese power declined, many people abandoned Catholicism. With the 
ousting of the Portuguese by the Dutch in 1605, the Dutch East India 
Company prevented its further spread.13 Only from 1800 onwards did the
9Geertz actually uses three divisions: santvi> abangany and prijaji. Clifford
Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960), esp. pp. 126-30 
and 228-35. But Koentjaraningrat has argued that a santri-abangan dichotomy is more 
meaningful. See Koentjaraningrat’s review of The Religion of Java in Madjalah Ilmu- 
Ilmu Sastva Indonesia, I, 2 (September 1963), pp. 188-91. See also Robert B. Cruik- 
shank, ’’Abangan, Santri and Prijaji: A Critique,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
III, 1 (March 1972), pp. 39-43.
10See Koentjaraningrat1s review cited above, at p. 189.
11Clifford Geertz, ’’Religious Change and Social Order in Suharto’s Indonesia,” 
Asia3 27 (Autumn 1972), pp. 68-70. For an analysis of kebatinan, see Mulder, "Aliran 
Kebatinan.”
12Geertz, ’’Religious Change,” p. 71.
13Frank L. Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society (New York: Friendship Press, 
1968), pp. 40, 43.
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Dutch colonial government permit Catholic missionaries to resume their 
work. A steady growth then ensued, which has accelerated since Inde­
pendence .
The growth of the Protestant church can be divided into three 
periods: the Dutch East India Company period, 1615-1815; the period
of activity by foreign missionary societies, 1815-1930; and the period 
of autonomous Indonesian churches, 1930 to the present. During the 
first period, the Protestant church built on Catholic foundations, 
taking over most of the existing Catholic congregations.14 This was 
the period of the "company church," which gave primary emphasis to 
serving Dutch congregations. Evangelization of the local population 
proceeded rather spasmodically, and the close identification of the 
church with the Company did not help.
It is important to recognize that in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Islam and Christianity were both intrusive religions, equally 
alien in their struggle for influence in an already well-established 
civilization where the major faiths of Hinduism and Buddhism had al­
ready made a deep impact. Both were accommodating to, and being accom­
modated by, the culture and belief patterns in the different regions 
where they entered. The fact that many of those who still held essen­
tially to these indigenous belief patterns went under the name of 
"Muslim” after the conversions of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries 
or under the name of "Christian" after somewhat later periods of mass 
conversion did not really make the task of instilling the basic tenets 
of the two faiths much easier.
The second period in the development of Protestant Christianity 
commenced with the British returning the Indies to the Dutch in 1816, 
after the Napoleonic Wars. The Church of the Indies came under the 
direct control of the colonial government but the development of a 
monolithic church was prevented by two developments. The first was 
the independent efforts of foreign missionary societies, which flour­
ished in western countries from the beginning of the nineteenth cen­
tury, and whose efforts in Indonesia started in the 1820s. The second, 
somewhat later, was the establishment of the Reformed Church, a break­
away group from the Church of the Indies, whose first congregation was 
formed in Jakarta in 1873.
To the extent that the church was active among the non-European 
population in the Dutch East India Company period, it worked primarily 
among the minority peoples of East Indonesia. This was the area of 
special interest for Portuguese and Dutch trade, and where Islam had 
penetrated selectively. The Church of the Indies maintained the same 
pattern: its four branches were in Maluku, Minahasa, and Timor (all
in Eastern Indonesia) and western Indonesia, centered in Jakarta.
But the missionary societies from the 1820s onward ranged broadly 
throughout the country,15 although they avoided areas where Islam was 
heavily entrenched and were not admitted to Java until 1849.16
14I b i d p. 40.
15For example, the Netherlands Missionary Society began working in Minahasa in 
1822, the English Baptists in Tapanuli in the 1820s, the Rhenish Missionary Society 
in Kalimantan in 1836 and on Nias in 1865, and the Utrecht Missionary Society in 
Halmahera in 1866.
16Christian missions were expressly forbidden in Aceh, Because of the fear of
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The missionary societies left a strong cultural and theological 
imprint on the peoples among whom they proselytized. A Calvinist theo­
logical background characterized the churches serving roughly three- 
fourths of Indonesian Protestants. But other notable influences have 
been the work of the German Rhenish Missionary Society among the Toba 
and Simalungun Batak and on Nias, and the work of the Rhenish Mission­
ary Society and later the Basel Mission in Kalimantan.
The late nineteenth century pattern of proselytization and of church 
government continued into the early decades of the twentieth century.
But the 1930s marked the beginning of a new era in church growth. In 
the 1930s and 1940s, most of the Indonesian churches received autonomy 
not only from government administrative control but also from church 
bodies outside Indonesia. The churches not only survived the Japanese 
Occupation but in many respects were strengthened by the difficulties 
they encountered. Their support for the Independence struggle against 
the Dutch legitimized them as something more than foreign transplants.
In the decades of autonomy that have followed, church growth has been 
very rapid indeed.
The areas of Indonesia longest Christianized are parts of Maluku, 
North Sulawesi, and East Nusatenggara. In these areas there is a con­
tinuous history of Christianity since the sixteenth century, together 
with a high proportion of Christians among the total population. This 
is not to say that a high proportion of the population has been Chris­
tian since the sixteenth century, because large scale conversion was 
delayed until the second half of the nineteenth century and, in the 
case of Timor, until the 1930s. But there has been Christian influ­
ence, and a continuous Christian community, since the sixteenth cen­
tury. North Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Central 
and South Sulawesi also have high proportions of Christians, but these 
are congregations of shorter standing. The period of heavy conversion 
in North Sumatra was in the 1880s and 1890s and into the early twen­
tieth century. The period of mass conversions in Irian Jaya was around 
1907 and again in more recent years. The growth of the Toraja Church 
in South and Central Sulawesi has been a product of the last seventy 
years, with very rapid growth in the early post-Independence period.17 
The Karo Batak Church in North Sumatra has grown remarkably since Inde­
pendence, and it made mass conversions after the 1965 coup;18 neverthe­
less, although Protestants now constitute a little more than 10 percent 
and Moslems also comprise a growing proportion of Karo Batak, most Karo 
continue to practice their traditional religion. In Timor, both the 
long-established Protestant church and the Catholics made rapid gains
violence. According to Furnivall, their exclusion from Java was also because of a 
fear of Moslem sensibilities. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (New 
York: NYU Press, 1956), p. 337.
17Hildred Geertz notes that although Protestant missionaries arrived in 1892, 
they made no headway either in conversion or in attracting students to their schools 
until after 1905, when the foundations of Toraja belief were shaken by the Dutch ad­
ministration’s prohibitions on headhunting and the ceremony of cleansing the bones. 
Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia 
(New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963),-pp. 76-77.
18In a year and a half (June 1966 to November 1967) membership of the Karo 
Batak Church increased by 25,000, an increase of about 83 percent over its former 
membership of some 30,000. Cooley, Indonesias p. 71.
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after the attempted coup,19 as did the church in East Java, whose mem­
bership doubled in five to eight years. Clearly, many of the mass con­
versions of the post-coup period were motivated simply by fear. There 
was safety in demonstrating adherence to a religion, given the strong 
official pressure to do so and the tendency in the post-coup period to 
equate lack of religious faith with communism.20 Groups of people 
seeking membership of churches, provided they were not known to show 
loyalty to the communist cause, were often accepted immediately in 
recognition of their plight. That such ’’conversions of necessity” were 
occurring concurrently with genuine mass revivalist movements is per­
haps not surprising in the context of the tense post-coup atmosphere.21
Finally, during this century there has been a rapid growth in the 
number of Chinese Christians. Very few Chinese were Christians at the 
turn of the century.22 Today Christians constitute approximately 
10 or 15 percent of the Chinese population in Indonesia,23 and probably 
a higher percentage among the young. Conversion of Chinese to Chris­
tianity accelerated in the 1960s, especially in East Java, and for 
Indonesia as a whole the proportion of Chinese who were Catholics rose 
from 2 percent in 1957 to 6 percent in 1969.24 The growth of Christi­
anity has been greatest among the peranakan (local-born) Chinese. This 
growth appears to represent both a response to intensive missionary 
efforts and a search for acceptance and identification in the Indone­
sian community through espousal of a more acceptable, less ’’Chinese” 
religion25 which at the same time removes the suspicion of communist 
sympathies.
19Frank L. Cooley, ”The Revival in Timor,” Occasional Bulletin from the Mis­
sionary Research Library^ XXIII, 10 (October 26, 1972); George W. Peters,
Indonesia Revival: Focus on Timor (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Books, 1973), 
esp. pp. 93-94.
2°See Motives for Conversion in East Java since September 1965 (Singapore: 
Foundation for Theological Education in South East Asia, 1970).
21The coexistence of these two reasons for Church growth is discussed in Cooley, 
”The Revival in Timor.” For a different view of the same events by a fundamentalist 
Protestant writer, see Kurt Koch, The Revival in Indonesia (West Germany: Evangeliza­
tion Publishers, n.d.), esp. pp. 158-60, 282-84.
22Indeed, even in 1933, according to Rauws, there were only 4,099 Chinese Chris­
tians, or 0.3 percent of the Chinese population, but he admitted that the figure was 
probably an underestimate. Joh. Rauws et al., The Netherlands Indies (London: Domin­
ion Press, 1935), p. 163.
23See Cooley, Indonesia, pp. 98-99. Some other studies lend support to Cooley’s 
estimate. More than 10 percent of Semarang’s Chinese population in 1955 was Chris­
tian, and the proportion was steadily increasing. Donald Earl Willmott, The Chinese 
of Semarang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 230. Castles estimated that 
almost 11 percent of Jakarta’s Chinese population were Christian in 1971. Lance 
Castles, ’’The Ethnic Profile of Jakarta,” Indonesia, 3 (April 1967), p. 170. Tan 
estimated that 16.7 percent of the peranakan Chinese of Sukabumi were Christian. 
Giok-lan Tan, The Chinese of Sukabumi: A Study in Social and Cultural Accommodation 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1963), p. 213.
2ifCoppel, ’’The Indonesian Chinese,” p. 196.
25G. W. Skinner, ’’The Chinese Minority,” in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia> p. 
108. Cooley notes that the peranakan Chinese, being almost entirely urban and more
26
The most noteworthy trend in the religious composition of the In­
donesian population during the present century has been the large-scale 
conversion from the traditional native religions in the more remote 
areas to either Islam or Christianity.26 Christianity appears to have 
made the larger gains, although it is impossible to be certain. There 
are no statistics for Moslems in the more remote areas comparable to 
the church membership data available for Christians, and from the 1930 
census data it is not possible to determine the Moslem population of 
various regions with the same precision as can be done with the Chris­
tian population.
Dahm claims that Christians constituted only one percent of the 
Indonesian population in 1900.27 By 1933 this proportion had grown to 
at least 2.8 percent. It had grown still further by 1961, and in 1971 
had reached 7.4 percent of the population.28 The main increase in the 
proportion of Christians appears to have come about in areas where 
there were still large numbers practicing traditional religions in 1930 
(interior regions of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, 
together with some islands of Maluku and East Nusatenggara) and through 
steady conversion of the Chinese. In addition, the substantial in­
crease in the size of the Christian community in Java is probably due 
in some degree to the conversion of Moslems (no doubt mainly of the 
abangan variety) to Christianity.
Through a careful comparison and reconciliation of data on church 
membership in 1933 with data on religion for certain regions and certain
familiar with western culture and secularization than most Indonesians, would tend to 
find Christianity attractive since it has had more experience in reacting to secular­
ization than have Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism.
26Conversions, of course, can differ greatly in their nature including both the 
adoption of Christianity by entire villages on the decision of a village leader (as 
in some of the Toba Batak areas in the late nineteenth century), through fear of 
political persecution (as with many of the post-1965 conversions), as an outcome of 
mass revivalist movements (as in Nias in 1916 and in Timor in 1965-66), or as a per­
ceived steppingstone to a civil service position in colonial times, as well as through 
the more "normal” process of an individual’s acceptance of the tenets of Christianity. 
Different churches and mission groups differ in the criteria they use for including a 
person in church membership figures, but the normal precondition is baptism.
27Dahm, History3 p. 17, and p. 270, n. 57.
28In the three regions for which data on religion are available for 1961, the 
proportion that was Christian rose between 1961 and 1971 as follows:
1961 1971
Jakarta 4.8 8.1
Jogjakarta 2.8 4.6
East Java 0.9 1.7
Sensus Penduduk 1961 D.C.I. Djakarta Raya (Angka-angka tetap) (Jakarta: Biro Pusat 
Statistik, 1973), p. 13; unpublished 1961 census data for Jogjakarta and East Java; 
Sensus Penduduk 1971, Series E, Volumes for Jakarta, Jogjakarta and East Java, Table 
12 (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1974).
However, it should be noted that in 1961 there was a substantial "others" and 
"unknown" category (2.7 percent in Jakarta, 5.2 percent in Jogjakarta and 0.9 percent 
in East Java) which almost disappeared in 1971. Some of the people so categorized 
in 1961 may have been.Christians.
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ethnic groups in the 1930 census,29 it has been possible to reconstruct 
trends in the number of Christians in various regions of Indonesia be ­
tween the early 1930s and 1971. These are shown in Table 1 and Maps 1 
and 2.30 Maps 1 and 2 can be directly compared visually because the 
same key has been used for both.
The 1933 figures may be underestimated for some regions,31 but the 
massive increase in the number of Christians in the subsequent 38 years 
cannot be disputed. The Indonesian population increased 1.9 times 
during this period, whereas the Christian population grew by more than 
this in every region and by 4.9 times in Indonesia as a whole (see 
final column of Table 1). Large numerical gains were recorded in some 
traditional Christian areas but without much increase in the proportion 
of Christians--North and Central Sulawesi and Maluku are cases in point. 
In some other areas, both large numerical and relative increases were 
recorded. These regions and the probable reasons why growth exceeded 
the natural increase of the population are as follows:
Java: migration of Christian groups,32 especially Batak but also
Minahasans and Ambonese; migration of Chinese Christians mainly from 
Sumatra and West Kalimantan. Migration was directed mainly to Jakarta 
and to a much lesser extent to other cities. Conversion of Chinese; 
conversion of Statistical Moslems."
Tapanuli and Nias and Mentawai Islands: continuing conversion of
local people.
North Sumatra excluding Tapanuli: migration of Batak to the East
Coast; conversion of Bataks, Chinese and other groups.
Rest of Sumatra: conversion of Chinese and other groups.
29Data on religion were collected for Batak, Minahasans, and Ambonese wherever 
they were living, and also for the total "native population" of some regions of Suma­
tra and Sulawesi.
30In these and subsequent maps, West Irian and a small section of Maluku have 
been excluded because data are not available for the rural areas of West Irian and in 
the interests of keeping the maps to a manageable size. Data were plotted by kabu- 
pat£n (regency) but kabupaten boundaries have been deleted if contiguous kabupatdn 
fall in the same range for the indicator.
31The census and church membership data were quite consistent in the regions 
with large Christian populations. This is not surprising in areas where whole vil­
lages belonged to the "ethnic church" and infant baptism was practiced. In a few 
other regions (e.g., West Java, the remainder of Sumatra, and Central Sulawesi), the 
census showed more Christians than the church membership data. This suggests that 
the church membership figures may also have been on the low side in some regions for 
which census data were not available. But the resulting understatement of the total 
number of Christians in Table 1 could not have been very great.
32General support for this contention comes from the fact that in 1971, 17 per­
cent of all lifetime migrants to Java were born in North Sumatra and a further 8 per­
cent in North Sulawesi or Maluku CSensus Penduduk 1971 [Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statis- 
tik], Series D, Table 23). Even if only half of these migrants were Christians, the 
proportion that was Christian among lifetime migrants to Java was clearly much higher 
than the proportion that was Christian among the 1930 population of Java, especially 
bearing in mind that some of the migrants from other provinces would also have been 
Christians. In 1971 the majority (62 percent) of the lifetime migrants to Java from 
North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and Maluku were living in Jakarta.
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Table 1. Approximate Trends in Number and Proportion of Christians in the Regions 
of Indonesia, 1933-71
Region
Number of 
Christians
Percentage of 
Population 
Christian
X-fold
Increase
(2)*(1)
(5)
1933
(1)
1971
(2)
1933
(3)
1971
(4)
West Java (incl. Jakarta) 34,600 614,300 0.3 2.3 17.8
Central Java (incl. Jogjakarta) 21,900 586,900 0.1 2.4 26.8
East Java 61,900 436,800 0.4 1.7 7.1
North Sumatra: 
Tapanuli Region* 349,000 892,000 30.2 55.3 2.6
Nias-Mentawai Is. 107,500 362,300 47.6 97.7 3.4
Remainder of N. Sumatra 8,200* 891,800 0.7+ 19.2 108.8
Rest of Sumatra 12,200 250,300 0.2 1.8 20.5
West Kalimantan 6,400 361,900 0.8 17.9 56.5
South Kalimantan 10,100 22,300 1.2 1.3 2.2
Central and East Kalimantan 7,200 239,300 1.3 16.7 33.2
North Sulawesi 401,400 958,600 53.4 55.8 2.4
Central Sulawesi 70,200 223,900 16.3 24.5 3.2
South Sulawesi 38,100 408,600 1.4 7.9 10.7
S.E. Sulawesi 2,300 13,600 0.5 1.9 5.9
Maluku 205,700 509,900 33.9 46.8 2.5
West Irian 82,800 348,000* 25.3 37.7* 4.2
Nusatenggara Barat (incl. Bali) 500 29,400 0.0 0.7 58.8
Nusatenggara Timur 405,500 1,823,300 23.4 79.4 4.5
All Indonesia 1,825,500 8,973,200 2.8 7.5 4.9
Source: Col. (1) computed from church membership data in Rauws et al., The Nether­
lands Indies, pp. 111-12, 159-62, 166-67, and 169; and Volkstelling 1930 (8 vols.; 
Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933-36), IV, p. 85; V, p. 93.
* In 1971, includes kabupaten of Dairi, Tapanuli Utara, Tapanuli Tengah, and Tapanuli 
Selatan.
t This figure is probably an underestimate.
* Rough estimate based on published figures for religious composition of urban areas 
and assumption that Christians constituted 30 percent of the population of rural 
areas. Cooley, writing in 1968 (.Indonesia, p. 60), stated that the total of Protes­
tants and Catholics exceeded 210,000. But a few years later, in 1974, there were re­
ported to be about 300,000 members of mainline Protestant churches, 140,000 baptized 
Catholics (and 80,000 preparing for baptism), and an unspecified number of members of 
Pentecostalist and fundamentalist groups. See International Review of Mission, LXIII, 
251 (July 1974), pp. 367-68, 377. This implies a total of some 500,000 Christians
in 1974, including about 45 percent of the rural population.
Map 1» Indonesia: Per Cent of Population Christian, 1930-33
Map 2. Indonesia: Per cent of Population Christian,
by Kabupaten and Kotamadya, 1971
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West Kalimantan: conversion of Chinese33 and those following tradi­
tional native religions.
Central and East Kalimantan: conversion of those following tradi­
tional native regions; some migration of Christians from elsewhere.
South Sulawesi: massive conversion of Toraja peoples from traditional
native religions.
East Nusatenggara: large-scale conversion from traditional native
religions in the 1950s and 1960s.
West Irian: conversion from traditional native religions in the
1950s and 1960s.
By mid-1976, with the incorporation into Indonesia of about half 
a million Christians in the former Portuguese Timor, and conservatively 
assuming a population growth rate of 2.5 percent among the Christian 
population, the number of Christians in Indonesia must have reached 
approximately 11 million, even supposing that no further conversions 
took place after 1971.
Religious Composition of the 
Indonesian Population in 1971
A detailed picture of the religious composition of the Indonesian 
population in 1971 is given in Table 2 and Maps 2 and 3. There are 
sharp differences in the distribution of Moslems and Christians. Where­
as 84 percent of Indonesia's Moslems live in Java and Sumatra (excluding 
North Sumatra), only 22 percent of the Christian population lives there. 
Bali, West Nusatenggara, and South Kalimantan also have very few Chris­
tians. In rural Java, the number of Christians is insignificant: only
one kabupatSn out of the 82 in Java is more than 5 percent Christian.
But Christians constitute 8 percent of the population of urban areas of 
Java (including Jakarta);34 and 13 percent of all Indonesian Christians 
live in these cities. The important Christian areas in terms of total 
numbers are North Sumatra, East Nusatenggara, North Sulawesi, and the 
cities of Java.
Although Maps 1 and 2 do not distinguish between Catholics and 
Protestants, there are some important differences in the distribution 
of the two groups, and Catholics appear to have made even faster gains 
than Protestants in the period since 1933. Catholics are especially 
strong in Central Java, in West Kalimantan, and in their old stronghold 
of East Nusatenggara, particularly the island of Flores.
Given that conversion has clearly been an important factor in the 
recent growth of Christianity, the question arises whether this conver­
sion has normally been one of family groups or whether it has tended 
to be age-selective. The 1971 census reports include data on religion 
by age which throw some light on this question. These data are sum­
marized for certain key provinces in Table 3. In Indonesia as a whole, 
there is a clear tendency for the proportion of Christians to be highest
33Large numbers of Chinese in West Kalimantan have become Catholics.
34In urban areas of Central Java and Jogjakarta, the proportion of Christians 
climbs to 11.6 percent.
3 2
Table 2. Indonesia: Religious Composition of the Population, by Region, 1971
Region Islam Christian* u . , Buddhist and Hindu ~ ~Confucian Other Total
Numbers (in Thousands)
Jakarta 3,831 366 7 338 6 4,546
Rest of Java: urban 7,957 753 13 394 12 9,129
Rest of Java: rural 61,315 520 159 335 27 62,354
North Sumatra 3,989 2,146 13 275 197 6,621
Rest of Sumatra 13,416 250 34 451 29 14,180
North Sulawesi 744 959 7 7 1 1,718
South Sulawesi 4,597 409 11 44 119 5,180
Rest of Sulawesi 1,361 237 0 3 26 1,628
West Kalimantan 863 362 3 137 655 2,020
Rest of Kalimantan 2,519 261 7 31 314 3,133
Maluku 543 510 4 4 28 1,090
Bali 108 18 1,978 16 0 2,120
West Nusatenggara 2,110 11 60 22 0 2,203
East Nusatenggara 192 1,823 0 7 273 2,295
Irian Jayat 33 116 0 1 0 151
All Indonesia^ 103,579 8,742 2,296 2,064 1,686 118,368
Percentage Distribution
Jakarta 84.3 8.1 0.2 7.4 0.1 100
Rest of Java: urban 87.2 8.2 0.1 4.3 0.1 100
Rest of Java: rural 98.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 100
North Sumatra 60.2 32.4 0.2 4.2 3.0 100
Rest of Sumatra 94.6 1.8 0.2 3.2 0.2 100
North Sulawesi 43.3 55.8 0.4 0.4 0.1 100
South Sulawesi 88.8 7.9 0.2 0.8 2.2 100
Rest of Sulawesi 83.6 14.6 0.0 0.2 1.6 100
West Kalimantan 42.7 17.9 0.1 6.8 32.4 100
Rest of Kalimantan 80.4 8.3 0.2 1.0 10.0 100
Maluku 49.9 46.8 0.4 0.4 2.5 100
Bali 5.1 0.8 93.3 0.8 0.0 100
West Nusatenggara 95.8 0.5 2.7 1.0 0.0 100
East Nusatenggara 8.4 79.4 0.0 0.3 11.9 100
Irian Jayat 21.9 76.8 0.0 0.7 0.0 100
All Indonesia**" 87.5 7.4 1.9 1.7 1.4 100
Source: Sensus Penduduk 1971  ^ Series D, Table 13.
Note: Small differences between totals and subtotals due to rounding.
* Includes the categories ”Catholic,” "Protestant,” and "other Christian.” 
t Irian Jaya figures refer only to the towns.
Map 3. Indonesia: Per cent of Population Moslem,
by Kabupaten and Kotamadya, 1971
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Table 3. Indonesia: Percentage Christian by Broad Age Groups, Selected Provinces, 1971
Age Group
All Indonesia West Java Central Java-Jogj a East Java North Sulawesi
Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total
0-9 10.1 7.4 4.9 1.0 11.1 2.2 6.9 1.5 51.9 52.4
10-19 11.2 8.1 6.0 1.3 13.4 3.0 8.0 2.1 54.1 56.0
20-29 12.4 8.1 7.5 1.4 15.8 3.3 9.3 2.2 51.7 52.9
30-49 9.6 6.4 6.0 1.1 9.3 1.9 6.6 1.4 57.8 59.3
50+ 9.1 6.9 6.2 1.1 8.0 1.8 6.8 1.6 58.6 64.8
All ages 10.6 7.4 5.9 1.1 11.6 2.4 7.5 1.7 54.2 55.8
Ratio, 10-29/30+ 1.24 1.24 1.09 1.26 1.61 1.65 1.27 1.40 0.92 0.90
Age Group
South Sulawesi E. Kalimantan Maluku E. Nusatenggara North Sumatra
Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total
0-9 12.2 8.3 2.8 19.0 45.6 44.9 71.0 80.6 30.4 32.7
10-19 14.0 8.6 2.7 13.2 47.2 48.5 71.7 82.1 30.0 32.9
20-29 13.3 7.7 4.5 19.3 43.9 43.4 74.7 81.9 28.7 33.9
30-49 10.9 7.1 2.2 17.4 46.8 47.7 67.0 78.4 26.6 31.3
50+ 7.5 7.1 1.2 14.7 50.1 52.0 62.8 68.8 17.7 30.3
All ages 12.2 7.9 2.8 17.1 46.4 46.8 70.5 79.4 28.3 32.4
Ratio, 10-29/30+ 1.37 1.15 1.73 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.11 1.09 1.24 1.08
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at ages 10-19 and 20-29. Above age 30 no clear age differentials 
emerge. The percentage Christian at ages 0-9 is intermediate between 
the higher figures at ages 10-29 and the lower figures at ages 30 and 
over, which is not surprising since such children would be considered 
to share their parents* religion and their parents would be included 
in both the below-30 and above-30 age groups.
The ratio of the proportion of Christians at ages 10-29 to those 
aged 30 and over is highest in Central Java, Jogjakarta, and East Java. 
It is also fairly high in West Java and South Sulawesi. The proportion 
of Christians reaches 16 percent among those aged 20-29 in urban areas 
of Central Java and Jogjakarta. These data suggest that conversion of 
Javanese (and perhaps Chinese) during the decade or so preceding the 
census had been heavily concentrated among young people.
By contrast, in Maluku and North Sulawesi no such tendency is 
apparent, nor is it very marked in areas such as East Nusatenggara and 
North Sumatra. These are all areas with large and long-established 
Christian communities.
Hindus are predominant only in Bali, but significant minorities 
are also found in East Java and Lombok. There have been some conver­
sions to Hinduism in East and Central Java in recent years.35
Buddhists and Confucians are almost all Chinese, but many Chinese 
are Christians. Therefore, although the distribution of Buddhists and 
Confucians reflects in a general way the distribution of the Chinese, 
it must be borne in mind that a higher proportion of Chinese may be 
Christians in some areas than others. Buddhists and Confucians are 
scattered fairly widely through the archipelago in urban areas, as well 
as in rural areas of the large islands of Bangka and Belitung which lie 
east of Sumatra and belong to the province of Riau. They were formerly 
widely distributed also in rural areas of West Kalimantan and parts of 
the east coast of Sumatra, but in 1959-60 the Chinese were moved into 
the cities (in the case of West Java, military force was used), and 
they were forbidden to trade in rural areas.36 The provinces with the 
highest proportion of Buddhists and Confucians are Jakarta, North Suma­
tra, Riau, and West Kalimantan.37 In some other provinces where the
35Because the 1961 census data on religion (available for East Java and Jogja­
karta but not for Central Java) combined Hindus with Buddhists and also contained a 
fairly large ’’others” category, comparison between 1961 and 1971 is difficult. In 
1971, there were 98,000 Hindus in East Java, 54,000 in Central Java, and 16,000 in 
Jogjakarta. Numbers of Hindus have clearly increased sharply in the kabupaten of „ 
Kediri, Blitar, Malang, and (most sharply of all) Banjuwangi in East Java and Gunung 
Kidul in Jogjakarta. In Central Java, most of the Hindus are in Klaten and Boyolali. 
See also Geertz, ’’Religious Change,” pp. 76-80.
36At the time of these persecutions, more than 100,000 Chinese opted for repa­
triation to China (Coppel, ’’The Indonesian Chinese,” p. 66).
37That the situation had not changed very greatly since 1930, despite the dis­
ruptions of the intervening period, is demonstrated by the following quotation from 
the 1930 census report: ”it is only in certain districts that their settlements have
attained any great numerical strength. These lie in a great circle around Singapore; 
in the north-western part of Borneo, the tin islands of Banka and Billiton, the Riouw 
archipelago and the Division of the East Coast of Sumatra. In these regions live a 
total of some 450,000 Chinese, or 17 percent of the total population living in those
36
proportion of Buddhists and Confucians is quite low, the proportion is 
more substantial in the urban areas because the Chinese are concen­
trated almost exclusively in these areas. For example, in urban areas 
of Central Java the proportion Buddhist and Confucian reaches 4.5 per­
cent, compared with 0.7 percent in rural areas.
Religion and Education
One could expect religion to be an important factor in explaining 
some of the differences in the social characteristics of the Indonesian 
population, such as educational attainment and labor force participa­
tion of women. It is an important factor, but its role is difficult 
to isolate from the mesh of historical factors and cultural and ethnic 
differences of which it is an integral component.
Education had a key role to play in the struggle of both Islam 
and Christianity to gain acceptance in the Indonesian setting. Given 
the multiplicity of competing beliefs and value systems, the Moslem 
school played a key role in establishing a clear and positive identity 
for Indonesian Islam. Moreover, the doctrinal, legalistic, and scrip­
tural quality of the mainstream of Islamic tradition and the limited 
role of institutions such as the priesthood, the sermon, and collective 
ritual left the school virtually alone as a means of imparting the doc­
trines of Islam.38 For Christian churches and missions, the school, 
surrounded as it was by an aura of modernity and the power and success 
of the colonial order, and, as it promised, opening doors into desir­
able civil service employment, was a powerful tool for spreading the 
influence of Christianity.
It has long been evident that education is more advanced in cer­
tain heavily Christian areas of Indonesia than elsewhere. North Sula­
wesi, Maluku, and North Sumatra had the highest education attainment 
among the adult population of any provinces in 1971, and the equivalent 
regions had the highest literacy rates in 1930 (except for South Suma­
tra and Lampung). Java has always lagged well behind these regions in 
educational development. Moreover, it is the predominantly Christian 
regions within North Sulawesi, Maluku and North Sumatra (i.e., Minahasa 
and Sangir-Talaud, Ambon, and Tapanuli, respectively) which rank high­
est of all in percentages of the population that are literate or have 
completed a primary education.
However, it is not possible to draw the simplistic conclusion that 
the Christian areas are the better-educated areas of Indonesia. A l ­
though some of the Christian areas have clearly long been in the fore-" 
front of educational development, others are still relatively backward 
educationally. Moreover, not all the areas where Christianity has long 
been established are educationally advanced: North Sulawesi and Maluku
are relatively advanced, while large areas of East Nusatenggara are
parts. Outside this area, it is only in Batavia and its environs that a large Chi­
nese population is met with. . . ." (VoTkstelling 1930, VII, p. 156.)
38Cf. Clifford Geertz, "Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case," 
in Robert N. Bellah (ed.), Religion and Progress in Modem Asia (New York: The Free 
Press, 1965), p. 96.
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not.39 By the same token, not all the areas more recently converted to 
Christianity are backward educationally: parts of Kalimantan and much
of Irian Jaya are, but the Tapanuli and Toraja areas are not.
Comparable differentials are found with regard to education in 
Moslem areas. For example, the Minangkabau and the Mandailing Batak 
have long had a much higher proportion of the population educated than 
have, for example, the Banten and Pesisir areas of West Java or the 
Buginese-Makassarese areas of South Sulawesi. Moreover, the Minangka­
bau and Mandailing Batak are noted for producing a disproportionate 
number of intellectuals and national leaders.
To understand why these differences exist requires a careful read­
ing of Indonesian history, with regard both to the timing and geographic 
allocation of missionary efforts, the timing and location of various 
Islamic reform movements, and other factors influencing the development 
of education.
In the beginning, the growth of Christianity was necessarily con­
fined largely to the areas of Eastern Indonesia which had been little 
penetrated by Islam and were of special interest for Portuguese and 
Dutch trade. The second ’’wave” of missionary activity which began in 
the late nineteenth century was concentrated in interior areas among 
ethnic groups which had remained animist--the Batak of North Sumatra, 
the Toraja of South Sulawesi, the Dayak of Kalimantan, and the Irianese. 
These groups were characterized by fierce independence, relative isola­
tion and cultural backwardness according to the lights of the more re­
fined coastal-dwelling peoples (and particularly of the Javanese).
Given the heterogeneity of the suku which are largely Christian 
and the varied history of their contact with western influence, a wide 
diversity in their level of educational development could be expected.
39The religious and educational history of East Nusatenggara is complex, and 
mapping religion and education by kabupat^n disguises relationships which would show 
up more clearly if kecamatan (district) data were available. The areas where educa­
tion was given most attention by the Dutch were Sikka and Larrantuka, both Catholic 
areas of Flores; and Roti and Savu, Protestant islands to the west of Timor. The 
kabupat^n of which these areas form a part show up well on all the educational indi­
cators available in the 1971 census. It is likely that if data were available for 
Roti and Savu alone, they would rank higher still; though if the literacy data from 
the 1930 census is any guide, they would still be well below Minahasa and Ambon. See 
Volkstelling 1930  ^ V, pp. 89-90, 207-8. The educational history of Roti is fascinat­
ing, with a continuous history of schooling since 1730, when the first Christian king 
of a Rotinese state requested a schoolmaster. The presence of a schoolmaster not only 
gave legitimacy to the claim of being a Christian state, but it also appeared to give 
an advantage in dealing with the Dutch. Thus states without Christian rulers were 
also soon demanding schoolmasters. In the nineteenth century, the Dutch, recognizing 
the educational "head start" the Rotinese had achieved, consciously fostered further 
educational advance. See James J. Fox, A Clash of Economies (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, forthcoming). The Rotinese remain the educational "elite" of the Timor 
area. See F. J. Ormeling, The Timor Problem (Groningen: Wolters, 1956), pp. 222-23.
Although the pockets of educational progress in Nusatenggara Timur clearly show 
a relationship between Christianity and educational development, it is also true that 
the areas most backward educationally include not only those with large animist popu­
lations (e.g., the island of Sumba) but also areas of "ceremonial Catholicism" in 
Timor (Belu and Timor Tengah Utara).
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The role of the Christian missions in stressing educational development 
has been a common thread in their experience, but the degree of empha­
sis on education has varied in different regions at different times, 
and the spread of education has been strongly influenced by the geo­
graphic isolation and extreme poverty of some of these regions (for 
example, much of East Nusatenggara and the interior of Kalimantan).
As for the second key factor, the historical development of educa­
tion, the Dutch were very slow to show an interest in fostering a rela­
tively widespread basic education in Indonesia. They lagged consider­
ably behind the British in India in this regard.40 Dutch interest in 
education grew during the second half of the nineteenth century, but 
not without considerable ambivalence as to the desirability of estab­
lishing broad-based public education.41 Even in 1900, in Java the 
budget allocation for education of Europeans was almost double that 
for the "education of natives,"42 and there were only 562 schools in 
Java (one per 50,000 inhabitants), more than half of which had been 
established by private enterprise.43 Thus the areas which had long 
been under effective Dutch control--notably Java--did not profit there­
by in terms of a more widespread basic education. Only in Ambon and 
Minahasa did education flourish, and this for the special reasons that 
mission education was firmly established there quite early and the 
Dutch found educated Ambonese and Minahasans invaluable in administer­
ing their far-flung domain.44 By the time the Dutch interest in edu­
cating their subjects developed, most other regions were also under 
effective Dutch control, and in this sense they all started off on an 
"equal footing" with Java.
Much of the early development of education in Indonesia was be­
cause of the work of Christian missions, which stressed education both 
as a means of imparting the Gospel and drawing unbelievers within the 
sphere of influence of the church, and as one of the benefits believers 
gained by accepting Christianity. Becoming a Christian also meant be­
coming westernized, and education was an integral part of westerniza­
tion. This interest of the missions in education was especially impor­
tant in Minahasa and Maluku, since Protestant Christianity was firmly 
established there earlier than in areas such as the Batak lands of 
North Sumatra or the Toraja area of South Sulawesi. And yet at the
40Furnivall attributes the difference to the smaller demand for clerks in Java 
under indirect rule and the Culture System (Fumivall, Colonial Policy, p. 377). The 
English writer Money, who visited Java in 1858 and was fulsome in his praise of Dutch 
colonial administration, nevertheless criticized this lack of attention to education. 
J. W. B. Money, Java: or How to Manage a Colony (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861), -
.quoted in Clive Day, The Dutch in Jana (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), 
p. 290.
41The first sign of a change in government policy was the grant of f.25,000 a 
year to be used for the education-of native officials, but a more significant step 
forward was the establishment of a special department for education, religion, and 
industry in 1866 (Day, The Dutch, pp. 390-91). It has been argued that there was no 
widespread popular demand for education in Java (Rauws et al., The Netherlands Indies, 
p. 87).
42Day, The Dutch, p. 389. 43Dahm, History, p. 15.
44As well as working for the Dutch as administrators and functionaries through­
out the Indies, the Ambonese and Minahasans provided the backbone of the Netherlands 
East Indies Army.
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turn of the century, not only Minahasa and Maluku, but also the Batak 
lands (Tapanuli) were dramatically ahead of the other regions when 
measured by the number of elementary schools per head of population 
(see Table 4). Even these figures do not tell the full story, because 
the mission schools frequently taught in Dutch, which opened the door 
to higher education for their graduates* 1 *5 and gave them an edge in ob­
taining civil service jobs.
The advanced state of education in Minahasa, the Batak country, 
and Ambon cannot be attributed simply to the efforts of the missions. 
Mission education was predominant in North Tapanuli and very important 
in Minahasa, and while it was not of great importance in Maluku, most 
of the private non-mission schools there were specifically Christian 
rather than secular schools. But in addition, in both Minahasa and 
Ambon the ratio of government schools to population was much higher 
than elsewhere, especially Java (see Table 4), and had been for some 
time; in 1882, out of 512 government native schools, 111 were in Manado 
and 29 in Sangihe-Talaud.1*6 This favoritism in the provision of gov­
ernment education was undoubtedly largely with a view to maintaining 
the supply of clerks for the government service from these regions.1*7
To say that the Dutch favored these two areas in the provision of 
education, however, begs the question of whether the Minahasans and 
Ambonese were more receptive to education and to "westernization" in 
general than were the Javanese. There are elements of the chicken and 
egg problem here. By the early twentieth century, the Minahasans and 
Ambonese were both better educated and more westernized than the Java­
nese. But to what extent the westernization was the result of their 
greater exposure to western education and to what extent the exposure 
to western education was the result of the colonial government's reac­
tion to their demonstrated receptivity to western influences is diffi­
cult to determine. Perhaps more important was the direct Dutch rule 
in Minahasa and Ambon, whereas the Dutch administration in Java was 
indirect, working through the local rulers.
Finally, even if the Dutch had been fairly even-handed in the pro­
vision of educational facilities, differences in educational development 
within the predominantly Moslem areas could have been expected as a 
result of the differing role accorded education by different Islamic 
groups and the varying strength of these groups in different regions. 
Within Java, Geertz argues, the santri variant of Javanese Islam, "be­
cause of its doctrinal complexity . . . its lack of close integration 
with some of the basic social forms and fundamental attitudes of peas­
ant society, and the hostility to it on the part of most non-santris ,M1*8 
needed the reinforcement of special schools, whereas the abangan vari­
ant did not. Thus in areas of santri dominance, the pondok or pesantr&n
^Dahm, History, p. 16.
1*6I. J. Brugmans, Gesahiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-1ndie (Gronin- 
gen-Batavia: Wolters, 1938), p. 264.
1*70ne author attributes the opening of government schools in Minahasa in the
1870s and 1880s to the "fanatically secular policy" of the Dutch East Indies Govern­
ment, which preferred opening its own schools to supporting the existing mission
schools. Hendrik Kraemer, From Missionhood to Independent Church (London: SCM Press,
1958), p. 12.
**8Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 177.
oTable 4. Elementary Schools in the Dutch East Indies about 1900.
Territory GovernmentSchools
Private
Schools
Mission
Schools Total
Population 
in 1000s
Population 
per School 
1000s
Population per 
Government 
School 1000s
Java and Madura 269 231 62 562 28,386 50 106
Sumatra (except Batak
country) 77 17 4 98 2,862 29 37
Batak country 19 6 175 200 321 1.6 17
Kalimantan 12 3 21 36 1,076 30 90
Sulawesi (except Menado) 14 - - 14 1,442 103 103
Menado* 115 14 237 366
(1895)
423 1.2 3.7
Ternate ^ 2 2 9 13 133 10 66
\ (Maluku)
Ambon J 74 75 17 166 271 1.6 3.7
Timor 15 10 16 41 306 7 20
Bali and Lombok 4 1 - 5
(1905)
1,039 208 260
Total 601 359 541 1,501 36,259 24 60
Source: Adapted from Bernhard Dahm, History> p. 16, Table 1.
* "Menado" refers to the present-day kabupatdn of Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondouw in North Sulawesi.
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(a mosque-linked religious school) developed. The teaching consisted 
of religious chanting in Arabic, with occasional commentaries or trans­
lations by the kijaji (the teacher or counsellor), and perhaps a very 
limited amount of general education. Since the 1920s, the modernists 
have succeeded both in establishing more modern forms of Islamic 
schools, called madrasah> in bringing elements of western education 
into many of the pondok, and in opening education more widely to girls. 
It is therefore very difficult to generalize about the forms of Islamic 
education. Some pondok devote less than half their time to religious 
education; others have not compromised at all with modern educational 
theories. The madrasah emphasize general education to a greater extent 
than the pondok and in some cases differ little from public schools.
There is no doubt that the madrasah have had a great impact on
the amount of secular education available to orthodox Moslems in Indo­
nesia. At the turn of the century there were virtually no madrasah; 
by 1954 there were about a million and a half pupils in madrasah com­
pared with nearly two million in pesantr&n.49
It is noteworthy that education is more widespread in many of the 
more orthodox Islamic areas (Aceh, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, and 
the Priangan area of West Java, for example) than in the areas of Cen­
tral and East Java where abangan elements are strong. Moreover, de­
spite the clear tendency for the ratio of females to males among those 
receiving schooling to be lower among Moslems than among Christians, 
this ratio was lower in Central and East Java than in many of the areas 
where Islam was stronger and more orthodox.50
In 1930, some of the lowest adult literacy rates in all Indonesia 
were recorded in the sultanates of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, and one
suspects that the feudal social structure and the poverty in these
regions had militated against the extension of education for any but 
the bangsawan (nobility), whereas the religious schools established in 
the more devout Moslem areas, for all their shortcomings, did provide 
basic literacy for many of their pupils. Moreover, it was precisely 
in the more devout Moslem areas that the reform missionary and social 
action movement in Indonesian Islam, the Muhammadiyah, was most active 
and was therefore able to do most in the field of education.51 Aside 
from this, special "ethnic" factors (e.g., the passion of the Minangka- 
bau of West Sumatra for education) are widely believed to be important 
explanatory variables.
However, to stress such broad "ethnic" factors as explanations for 
differential educational progress while ignoring the historical context 
in which education developed would be as unwise in the case of the Mos­
lem regions as it would be for the Christian regions. The rapid
*9Ibid.
50One of the lowest ratios of female to male literacy of all was found among 
Arabs, a minority immigrant and immigrant-descended group who have adhered more 
strictly to the Middle Eastern version of Islam. But the Arab ratio for Java as a 
whole did not fall as low as the f,native population*s" ratio in parts of Central and 
East Java and Bali.
51The Muhammadiyah was actually founded in Jogjakarta, and continues to play a 
major role there; nevertheless its role is on the whole greater in the more devout 
Moslem areas than in areas such as Central Java.
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progress of education in West Sumatra in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century was partly due to the rapid expansion of the govern­
ment school system, especially in the second decade of the century.52 
But this expansion was partly in response to a rapidly developing taste 
for education as modernist movements developed in response to the chal­
lenge of expanding Dutch political and economic domination. There were 
both Islamic and more secular movements. The Kaum Muda, led by Datuk 
Sutan Maharadja, sought kemajuan (advancement or progress) through edu­
cational development and laid particular stress on education of girls.53 54
The Islamic modernists also promoted their reforms through education.
In the ferment of social change and the competition between adat3 tra­
ditional and reformed Islam, and western ideas introduced by the Dutch, 
then, education played a major role.
Among the Mandailing Batak, too, the rapid spread of education in 
the second half of the nineteenth century appears to have been part of 
their cultural resurgence, which was to some degree stimulated by the 
crisis of increasing Dutch influence and control.5** The question still 
remains, however, as to why a growing interest in education should have 
been one reaction to increasing Dutch influence among the Minangkabau 
and Mandailing Batak, but not to the same extent among many other Mos­
lem groups.
In the twentieth century, particularly since Independence, the 
spread of education has been much less dependent on religious factors 
or the degree of government interest in different regions; it has been 
more dependent on a unified government education policy. At the time 
of the 1930 census, however, the diffusion of literacy among adults in 
particular regions reflected their religious history, along with other 
special circumstances (see Table 5).
A short diversion is necessary here to examine the comparability 
of the definitions of literacy in the 1930 and 1971 censuses, on which 
most of the analysis in the present section is based. As the English 
summary of the 1930 census report would have it,
Literates were considered to be in general persons who (may it be 
with mistakes) were able to write a note to an acquaintance on an 
ordinary subject, no matter in which language or with which charac­
ters. Furthermore were usually regarded as literates persons that 
at the period of the census went to school and were at least in the 
third class of a village, Government or private school.
The 1971 census considered literates to be persons who could both read 
and write simple sentences in any kind of letter or character. Persons 
who could read but not write were classified as "illiterate.M
The definitions in the two years, with their emphasis on ability 
to write, appear to be closely comparable. We can be less certain that 
this was also true of their actual application by the enumerators.
52Taufik Abdullah, ’’Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the 
Early Decades of the Twentieth Century,” in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics 
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 212-13.
33Ibid.3 pp. 219-24.
54Cf. Lance Castles, ’’The Political Life of a Sumatran Residency: Tapanuli 
1915-1940” (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1972), pp. 23-24, 71, 180, 250.
Table 5. Literacy of the Native Population, by Division, 1930
Division (Gewesten)
Adult Population 
% Literate CD
(2)
(4)
% of Adult 
Literates with 
Elementary 
Education 
(5)
Total Population 
% Literate (6)
(7)
(9)
% of Literates 
with
Elementary
Education
(10)
Males
a)
Females
(2)
Total
(3)
Males
(6)
Females
(7)
Total
(8)
West-Java 14.7 2.7 8.2 5.4 74.3 11.7 2.7 7.1 4.3 80.6
Midden-Java 12.0 1.0 6.1 12.3 82.5 10.8 1.2 5.9 8.9 87.9
Jogj akarta 10.1 0.9 5.2 11.4 76.0 8.0 1.0 4.4 8.2 83.0
Surakarta 8.9 0.9 4.7 10.1 68.1 6.5 0.8 3.6 7.9 75.5
Oost-Java 9.1 0.6 4.6 14.0 78.2 8.2 0.8 4.4 10.5 85.0
All Java--Madura 11.4 1.3 6.0 8.7 77.4 9.7 1.4 5.5 6.8 83.9
Atjeh en onderh. 13.9 1.8 7.6 7.8 74.7 12.2 2.0 7.1 6.2 81.0
Tapanuli 28.4 3.6 15.6 7.9 87.8 21.2 3.7 12.4 5.8 91.0
Oostkust van Sumatra 17.5 1.4 9.8 12.7 62.8 14.7 1.6 8.4 9.3 69.5
Westkust van Sumatra 17.0 3.7 9.9 4.6 81.3 15.0 4.3 9.6 3.5 86.6
Riau en onderh. 13.4 1.1 7.0 12.5 65.3 10.0 1.0 5.6 9.7 72.3
Djambi 17.7 0.9 9.4 19.9 55.4 13.4 0.8 7.3 16.5 62.9
Palembang 29.1 7.4 18.2 3.9 38.6 20.1 5.0 12.6 4.0 45.2
Bengkulen 32.8 5.6 19.4 5.9 71.1 25.5 4.8 15.5 5.3 77.6
Lampung 46.3 34.3 40.3 1.4 16.7 31.0 22.7 26.9 1.4 22.1
Bangka en onderh. 23.5 1.9 12.6 12.1 77.3 18.5 2.0 10.4 9.4 82.4
All Sumatra 21.7 4.7 13.1 4.6 60.4 17.1 4.1 10.7 4.2 68.8
Borneo 13.1 0.7 6.8 15.4 58.0 9.6 0.8 5.2 11.9 65.8
Celebes en onderh. 9.9 1.5 5.4 6.6 33.9 7.3 1.2 4.2 6.1 47.0
Menado 36.6 21.8 29.0 1.7 93.8 26.4 17.3 21.9 1.5 94.7
All Celebes 17.2 6.6 11.6 2.6 73.3 12.5 5.4 8.9 2.3 78.2
Bali en Lombok 7.8 0.4 4.0 21.2 29.6 6.1 0.4 3.2 16.8 42.2
Timor en onderh. 7.1 2.4 4.7 2.9 87.2 7.5 2.8 5.1 2.7 91.2
Molukken 21.7 15.5 18.6 1.4 91.4 16.7 12.2 14.5 1.4 91.7
All Outer Islands 17.2 4.6 10.7 3.7 65.6 13.4 4.0 8.7 3.4 72.8
All Netherlands Indies 13.2 2.3 7.4 5.8 72.3 10.8 2.2 6.4 5.0 79.4
Chinese--All Neth. »
Indies 50.9 15.4 38.6 3.3 39.5 12.4 28.9 3.2
Source: VolkstelUng 19303 VIII, Table 14, pp. 110-11; IV § V, Table 22; I, Table 27; II, Table 26; III, Table 25. 04
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To return to Table 5, in Java 94 percent of the adult population 
was still illiterate in 1930. Literacy was highest in West Java, espe­
cially in the Priangan region surrounding Bandung. Outside Java, adult 
literacy rates on the whole were substantially higher, though there 
were areas of extremely low literacy such as Bali,55 southern Sulawesi 
and most of Borneo and Nusatenggara. Literacy was most widespread in 
the divisions of Lampung, Bengkulu, Palembang, Tapanuli, and Bangka in 
Sumatra (all above 12 percent), in Menado in Sulawesi (29 percent) and 
in Maluku (19 percent). In Tapanuli, Menado, and Maluku the influence 
of the missions is clear, not only in the high overall literacy rates56 *
but also in the high female literacy relative to male and the high pro­
portion of literates who had received formal education. The high 
literacy rates in southern Sumatra are, however, not explicable on the 
basis of religion. In Palembang and Lampung, the proportion of liter­
ates with formal education was quite low, suggesting that there may 
have been a massive overstatement of literacy in these two divisions. 
But the 1930 census report offers a different explanation: the preva­
lence of a village game in that part of Sumatra in which "the youths 
and maidens court one another with love letters (mandjau).M57 This 
game, the census report claims, would account not only for the high 
overall literacy level but also for the outstanding high ratio of fe­
male to male literates.
The 1930 census report commented as follows on the regional dif­
ferences in literacy:
The explanation of the higher relative number of literates in 
regions where schooling has been furnished for the natives on a broader 
scale for many decades past and in places where opportunities for em­
ployment are offered for the better educated is obvious enough. In 
the cities much higher percentages are met with, while the Preanger 
owes its many literates to the fact that as early as the second half 
of the 19th century popular education had made great strides there.
In the Minahasa, in the Moluccas and here and there in the Lesser 
Sunda Islands the educational facilities furnished by the missions,
55As in Jogjakarta and Surakarta, the feudal social structures in Bali no doubt 
militated against the spread of popular education.
56The emphasis on female education by the missions had long resulted in high 
proportions of females among pupils not only of the mission schools but also of the 
government schools. The following table (derived from Brugmans, Geschiedenis, p. 
266) shows the number of males and females attending government native schools in 
Ambon and Java:
Males Females % Females
Ambon 1877 3,162 2,384 43.0
Java 1877 12,498 25 0.2
Java 1897 24,732 301 1.2
Volks telling 1930, VIII, p. 53; see also IV, p. 109,. One is
parallel between this reason for literacy and the situation among the Buhid, a people 
of the southern mountain regions of Mindoro in the Philippines, who use an Indie- 
derived script to exchange bamboo-incised messages and to record their prayers, 
chants, and love songs. It is. claimed that there is a 70 percent literacy rate among 
this people, although there is no established method or system of instruction in 
learning to write the script. See Anton Postma, ’’Contemporary Mangyan Scripts,” 
Philippine Journal of Linguistics, II, 1 (June 1971), p. 7.
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both Catholic and Protestant, have borne fruit to the extent that in 
some regions already more than half of the adults, both male and 
female, can read and write.58
The figures in Table 5 mask some sharp differences in literacy 
rates revealed by the more detailed afdeeling (district) figures. For 
example, these figures reveal the higher literacy in the Priangan area 
of West Java and in certain districts of Central Java compared to Java 
as a whole. Rather than map them, I have chosen to map data which are 
of still more interest.
The proportion of literates with elementary schooling in 1930 
differed sharply in the different districts. For example, in Lampung 
and Bali fewer than 30 percent of the adult literates had elementary 
education, whereas in Menado 94 percent did. Since literacy data are 
"soft" data subject to flexibility in interpretation at the collection 
stage, and since the influence of the missions on education was through 
the provision of formal education, Map 4 presents the proportion of 
persons in 1930 who were both literate and had an elementary education, 
by region. The pattern which emerges reflects very clearly the influ­
ence of the missions on educational development. Menado and the 
Sangihe-Talaud Islands, South Maluku, and Tapanuli emerge as the most 
"schooled" areas. Lampung does not stand out because its high literacy 
was achieved without the benefit of much schooling. Most striking of 
all is the overall very low levels of literacy and education. Over 
very large areas of the country fewer than 6 percent of adults had re­
ceived enough schooling to make them literate. By almost any criterion, 
the Dutch had failed badly in their educational efforts. Literacy lev­
els were much lower in Indonesia than in neighboring Malaysia and the 
Philippines, and the Dutch-native education commission estimated that 
at the rate of progress being made in 1928 it would require 167 years 
to wipe out illiteracy.59
It was clear enough from the 1930 figures that literacy rates were 
rising and that the overwhelming predominance of males among the liter­
ates was lessening over time.60 It was also clear that only a tiny 
fraction of literates could read and write Dutch and therefore that the 
earlier hope that Dutch might become a lingua franca for the Indies 
would not be realized.
By 1971, the massive broadening of the educational base due to the 
vigorous efforts to widen educational opportunities after Independence 
had obliterated the earlier geographical and sex differentials to some 
extent, though these were of course still pronounced among the popular 
tion above about age 40, who had received their education in the pre- 
Independence period. But the detailed data on literacy in each kabu- 
pat&n are available only for the total population 10 years of age and 
above. Map 5, based on these data, shows that most of the key geographic
5BVolkstelling 1930, VIII, p. 55.
59Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (Berkeley: California University 
Press, 1944), p. 216.
60The rise in literacy rates is clear from a comparison of 1930 with 1920 fig­
ures, as well as from the fact that literacy among the non-adult population, almost 
half of whom would have been still too young to attend school, was almost as high as 
that of the adult population.
Map 4. Indonesia: Percentage of the Adult Population who were both
Literate and with Elementary Education, 1930
Map 5# Indonesia: Per Cent of Population Literate, by Kabupaten
and Kotamadya, 1971
100' 110° 120' 130°
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differentials in 1930 (see Map 4) remain. Literacy rates, despite 
sharp increases in all regions, remain lowest in parts of Central and 
East Java, Bali, West Nusatenggara, South Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan. 
Within Java, the Priangan areas—of—We_st Java and the Banyumas-Jogja- 
karta-Salatiga area of Central Java remain far more literate than the 
north coastal areas of West Java and western Central Java-ox iladura 
and peninsular East Java. Tapanuli, Minahasa, and Ambon remain the 
most literate areas of all.
Similar differentials are evident when we compare educational 
attainment rather than literacy in 1971 (see Maps 6 and 7). The pro­
portion of the population with completed primary school is higher in 
the areas where literacy is higher, with few exceptions. Java con­
tinues to rank relatively low, with the exceptions of the Priangan 
area and to a lesser extent a belt in south Central Java from Banyumas 
through to Jogjakarta and Klaten, and a section of East Java from 
Madiun to Sidoarjo and south through Kediri to Blitar. Central Kali­
mantan stands out in educational attainment, and the kabupatSn with 
higher proportions of Christians are also those with higher proportions 
of persons who have completed elementary school (cf. Map 2). The pro­
portion of the population that has completed junior high school (S.L.P.) 
follows a similar pattern, although a few regions (e.g., the Kediri- 
Blitar area of East Java, NTT, Maluku, and parts of South Sumatra) rank 
relatively lower according to this measure than they do according to 
the measure of "proportion completed primary school."
The narrowing of the earlier geographic differentials in the pro­
vision of education is clearly apparent in Table 6, which compares edu­
cational attainment by age in a number of different provinces. Though 
North Sulawesi and Maluku still have the edge over most provinces at 
the younger ages, the difference is far less striking than at the older 
ages. Indeed, North and West Sumatra exceed North Sulawesi and Maluku 
in educational attainment at the younger ages. Other provinces such 
as Central and East Java, Bali, and South Sulawesi, though they are 
still well behind the educationally more advanced provinces in terms 
of proportion of young adults with completed primary education, lag 
much less than they did previously.
Sex inequality in education has also lessened dramatically over 
time (see Table 7). Among the population 60 years of age and over, 
the group who would have received their primary education in the 1920s 
or earlier, there are 6 to 8 males for every female among those who 
have completed a primary education in provinces such as East Java and 
North Sumatra, compared with 1 to 2 males for every female in North 
Sulawesi and Maluku. But for persons in their early 20's (representing" 
those who have recently passed through the nation's educational system) 
there are only 1 to 2 males to every female who has completed a primary 
education in all the listed provinces except Bali. Judging by the 
sharp fall in the ratio between the cohort ages 30-34 and the cohort 
ages 15-19 in Central and East Java and in Bali, education for females 
in the post-Independence period would appear to have made particularly 
rapid strides in these provinces.
The analysis so far has noted the complexity of the educational 
situation in different parts of Indonesia, and some of the historical 
factors which account for this complexity. It is now time to focus 
directly on educational differentials according to religion.
Map 6. Indonesia; Per Cent of Population Aged 10 Years and Above who had
Completed Elementary School, bv Kabupaten and Kotamadva. 1971
Map 7. Indonesia: Per Cent of Population Aged 10 Years and Above who had
Completed Junior High School, by Kabupaten and Kotamadva. 1971
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Table 6. Percentage of Population Completed Elementary School, by Age, Selected 
Provinces, 1971
Province
Age Group
15-19 20-24 30-34 40-44 50-54 60-64 70+
North Sumatra 57.4 61.8 47.2 33.5 22.9 13.4 8.1
West Sumatra 57.4 61.1 50.3 36.7 27.5 16.8 8.6
Maluku 56.5 60.5 46.1 35.9 32.5 30.3 27.3
North Sulawesi 53.8 59.5 50.9 35.2 34.6 31.0 25.1
East Nusatenggara 50.1 53.9 43.0 19.0 13.4 7.5 3.6
Aceh 52.0 53.8 40.2 27.0 18.3 12.1 9.9
South Sumatra 41.1 46.4 34.4 22.7 16.5 10.3 6.5
West Java 47.3 46.3 30.0 20.4 16.1 10.8 7.7
South Sulawesi 49.3 45.5 26.5 14.2 7.0 4.4 2.0
East Java 43.6 43.4 22.9 14.9 11.1 6.3 5.4
Central Java 40.8 40.8 20.6 13.3 10.3 6.0 4.6
Lampung 37.7 37.7 26.1 18.9 16.0 11.2 7.5
Bali 43.5 37.2 21.3 11.1 7.1 2.9 1.4
Source: Sensus Penduduk 1971, Series E, Table 16.
Note: These provinces are ranked according to the percentage with completed primary
education among the age group 20-24.
Table 7. Ratio of Proportion of Males Who Had Completed Elementary School to 
Proportion of Females Who Had Completed Elementary School, by Age, 
Selected Provinces, 1971
Age Group
Province
15-19 20-24 30-34 40-44 50-54 60-64 70+
North Sumatra 1.16 1.29 1.73 2.18 3.45 6.47 5.52
West Sumatra 0.95 1.12 1.40 1.55 2.43 4.91 9.89
Maluku 1.16 1.20 1.40 1.41 1.33 1.32 0.89
North Sulawesi 0.90 1.01 1.20 1.46 1.47 1.76 2.27
East Nusatenggara 1.12 1.29 1.75 1.96 2.73 3.31 2.69
Aceh 1.15 1.36 1.90 2.76 5.10 11.80 3.29
South Sumatra 1.26 1.50 2.12 2.49 5.60 6.00 4.33
West Java 1.14 1.49 2.13 2.18 3.28 3.76 3.97
South Sulawesi 1.14 1.47 2.21 3.34 5.82 4.69 5.67
East Java 1.32 1.31 2.71 3.53 5.39 6.83 8.31
Central Java 1.37 1.70 3.09 3.16 4.65 8.00 9.44
Lampung 1.27 1.57 2.42 2.43 5.13 5.66 43.00
Bali 1.76 2.22 3.30 5.62 12.00 13.00 26.00
Source: Sensus Penduduk 1971, Series E, Table 16.
Note: The ordering of provinces is the same as in Table 6.
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Using the 1971 census data, it is possible for the first time to 
compare specifically the educational attainment of those professing 
different religious faiths. Table 8, which summarizes these data, 
shows that despite the narrowing of differentials which has undoubtedly 
occurred at the younger ages, the contrast between Moslems and Chris­
tians 10 years of age and over remains sharp. Forty-one percent of 
Moslems have no education at all, compared with 22 percent of Chris­
tians. The proportion of Christians with high school education or 
better is three times as high as that of Moslems.61 A small part of 
these differentials can be attributed to the greater concentration of 
Christians to that of Moslems in urban areas, where educational levels 
are higher; but Table 8 clearly demonstrates that in both urban and 
rural areas the average educational attainment of Christians is well 
above that of Moslems.
Buddhists and Confucians resemble Christians more than they do 
Moslems in educational attainment, but only because they are much more 
urbanized than the other groups. Within both urban and rural areas, 
their average educational attainment is far below that of the Chris­
tians. The extremely low educational attainment of "others" reflects 
the low educational levels of the Balinese population and of the adher­
ents of traditional native religions scattered throughout various more 
isolated regions.
The figures in Table 8 reflect the tendency for Christians to be 
concentrated in those provinces where educational attainment is high 
(not forgetting, of course, that it is high partly because there are 
many Christians in these provinces). But what of Christian-Moslem 
differences in provinces where there are significant numbers of both? 
Unpublished data are available from the 1971 census for Maluku, North 
Sulawesi, and East Nusatenggara, and these are summarized in Table 9. 
Unfortunately, they are not available for other provinces of particular 
interest such as North Sumatra and Jakarta.
The data in Table 9 show that the average educational attainment 
of Christians is well above that of Moslems in Maluku and North Sula­
wesi but almost identical in East Nusatenggara. That the long-standing 
educational progress of Maluku and North Sulawesi has affected Moslems 
as well as Christians is evident from the fact that Moslems in these 
provinces, though less well-educated than Christians, are better edu­
cated than their fellow Moslems, and even the total population, in 
Indonesia as a whole.
The numbers of Buddhists and Confucians in these three provinces 
is very small, but it is of interest that their average educational 
attainment exceeds that of Christians in each province.
Although no data are available for North Sumatra on religious dif­
ferentials in educational attainment, data are available on educational
61Differences between Catholics and Protestants are not very great. Overall, 
Catholics have higher proportions than Protestants at both ends of the education 
scale— those with no education and those with a university or academy education. 
Catholics in urban areas have higher proportions with university or academy educa­
tions than do Protestants. In rural areas, Protestants are somewhat better educated 
across the board. This no doubt reflects the high concentration of rural Catholics 
in Flores, where educational levels, as elsewhere in East Nusatenggara, are rela­
tively low.
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Table 8. Indonesia: Educational Attainment of Population Aged 10 Years and Over, by 
Religion, 1971 (Percentage Distribution)
Residence and Education Moslem Christian* Buddhist and Confucian Other^
All
Religions
Urban
No school 24.7 6.4 16.6 32.0 22.3
Some or completed primary 56.6 51.4 64.2 47.8 56.5
Completed junior or senior high 17.3 38.4 18.7 18.6 19.7
Academy/university 1.3 3.9 0.4 1.6 1.5
All levels 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers (in *000) 11,717 1,548 942 177 14,384
Rural
No school 44.9 28.0 44.0 - 59.7 44.3
Some or completed primary 51.9 62.3 51.8 38.2 52.1
Completed junior or senior high 3.2 9.5 4.2 2.0 3.5
Academy/univers ity 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
All levels 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers (in *000) 58,642 4,397 584 2,500 66,123
All Indonesia
No school 41.5 22.4 27.1 57.9 40.4
Some or completed primary 52.6 59.4 59.5 38.8 52.9
Completed junior or senior high 5.5 17.0 13.1 3.2 6.4
Academy/university 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.3
All levels 100 100 100 100 100 -
Numbers (in ’000) 70,359 5,945 1,526 2,677 80,507
Source: Sensus Penduduk 19713 1Series D, Table 20.
* Includes Catholics, Protestants, and !fother Christians." 
t Includes Hindus and "others."
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Table 9. Maluku, North Sulawesi, and East Nusatenggara: Educational Attainment of 
Population Aged 10 Years and Over, by Religion, 1971 (Percentage Distri­
bution)
Region and Education Moslem Christian* Buddhist and Confucian Other^"
All
Religions
Maluku
No school 34.7 12.6 20.5 70.8 25.0
Some or completed primary 59.3 75.9 66.4 28.7 66.6
Completed junior or senior high 5.8 11.2 13.1 0.5 8.2
Academy/univers ity 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
All levels 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers (in *000) 360 349 4 20 732
North Sulawesi
No school 22.0 9.6 4.7 37.7 14.8
Some or completed primary 69.4 76.1 67.4 54.3 73.2
Completed junior or senior high 8.2 13.7 26.6 7.6 11.5
Academy/university 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.4 0.5
All levels 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers (in *000) 480 664 6 5 1,155
East Nusatenggara
No school 38.3 38.1 10.9 70.1 42.0
Some or completed primary 56.4 55.7 69.7 29.4 52.5
Completed junior or senior high 5.2 6.0 19.4 0.5 5.3
Academy/university 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
All levels 100 100 100 100 100
Numbers (in f 000) 131 1,241 4 196 1,573
Source: Unpublished tabulations from the 1971 population census.
* Includes Catholics, Protestants, and "other Christians.” 
t Includes Hindus and "others."
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attainment by kabupatSn, and by comparing kabupatSn with high and low 
proportions of Christians and Moslems respectively, it is possible to 
obtain a rough picture of religious differentials in education. On 
the whole, the kabupatSn and kotamadya with high percentages of Chris­
tians have a higher average educational attainment than those with low 
proportions of Christians. The two key exceptions are Nias, which al­
though almost entirely Christian has a low educational attainment, and 
South Tapanuli, which although 95 percent Moslem has the highest educa­
tional attainment of all kabupatSn in North Sumatra. The explanation 
probably has to do with the isolation and relative poverty of Nias62 
and the rapid spread of education among the Moslem Mandailing Batak of 
South Tapanuli as part of their cultural resurgence during the second 
half of the nineteenth century.
Summary and Conclusions
The religious situation in Indonesia is still somewhat fluid. The 
most noteworthy trends between 1930 and 1971 were the decline in the 
number following traditional native religions as these groups embraced 
either Islam or Christianity, the adoption of Christianity by signifi­
cant numbers of Chinese and Javanese, and a blurring of the identifica­
tion of religion with suku. Though in the majority of cases, one's 
suku still reliably indicates one's religion, this is now less true 
than it was of suku such as the Dayak of Kalimantan, the Karo Batak, 
the Chinese, and the Javanese. (It never was true for the Javanese, 
of course, unless one was willing to overlook the deep and highly im­
portant divisions within Javanese Islam.) There is also a trend to­
wards increasing diversity within Indonesian Christianity; groups such 
as Seventh Day Adventists and Pentecostalists are making inroads in 
areas such as Minahasa and Ambon where the "ethnic churches" to which 
most of the population adhere have married the indigenous culture with 
the Christian faith. One trend, common in many countries, but which 
is not occurring in Indonesia, is for an increasing proportion of 
people to claim not to profess a religion. But to assume that this 
situation reflects much more than the present political situation in 
Indonesia would be naive.
In interpreting educational differentials, it must be borne in 
mind that the quality of the data we are working with is poor. Liter­
acy is a term subject to differences of interpretation. In addition, 
educational attainment, even if reported accurately, does not distin­
guish between schooling of different kinds and quality (e.g., compari­
sons between pesantr&n, madrasah, government, or Catholic schools). 
Nevertheless, meaningful patterns do emerge and these patterns on the 
whole are consistent with expectations based qn a careful reading of 
Indonesian educational and religious history. I have not touched at 
all on the problems of tertiary education, particularly the fact that 
though the Outer Islands population on the whole is better educated 
than that of Java, the best institutions of higher education are in
62In 1930, the afdeelingen of Nias had a literacy rate intermediate between 
that of the Tapanuli region and the east coast districts of North Sumatra. By con­
trast with other areas, almost all those literate in Nias had had elementary school­
ing. Female literacy in Nias was as high as anywhere in North Sumatra. The other 
regions have clearly made faster progress than Nias since that time.
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Java, thus accentuating the "brain drain" from the Outer Islands to 
Java.
Religion is still a good predictor of educational attainment, 
though it is becoming less so over time as previously existing differ­
entials in the provision of education are blurred by the current policy 
of expanding state education towards the goal of at least primary edu­
cation for all children. But differences will long remain. The bene­
fit of schooling can be strongly reinforced in the home, and better 
educated parents are better situated in this respect. Moreover, access 
to education of better quality is still heavily dependent on wealth and 
status. In both these respects, Christians on the average are better 
able than Moslems to benefit from the educational opportunities now 
available. But this conclusion is drawn from a picture painted on a 
very broad canvas, as are many of the other conclusions of this paper. 
There is value in such an approach, for it helps give a broad perspec­
tive. But there are also dangers, especially the danger of failing to 
recognize the complexity of the relationships under consideration at 
the local level. Why, for instance, are the Rotinese so much more ad­
vanced educationally than the Timorese? Why are the Balinese on Lombok 
better western-educated than the Moslem Sasak? What has been the role 
of Christian missions in the development of education in Kalimantan 
Tengah? Questions such as this must be answered by much more intensive 
regional studies drawing on more diverse sources of information. Such 
studies will both complement and test the validity of the findings of 
the present study regarding religious and educational change in Indo­
nesia.
